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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4685
Kenya has long had a reputation of being politically risky, 
manifested in corruption, uncertainty about policies, 
and the importance of political connections in doing 
business. Kenya began its economic liberalization in 
1993.  Reform picked up speed after a tightening of aid 
by donors on governance grounds and an attempt to 
re-establish credibility following the costly Goldenberg 
scandal uncovered in 1992. But tangible results in the 
shape of favorable government debt dynamics and a 
pick up in growth took a decade to materialize.  The 
paper argues that the peaceful presidential election and 
transfer of power in December 2002 was central to the 
economic upswing after 2002. The subsequent decline in 
political risk was singled out by the private sector as an 
This paper—a joint product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Department, Africa Region, and the 
Economic Policy and Debt Department, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network—is a background 
paper for the Country Economic Memorandum on economic growth in Kenya. Policy Research Working Papers are also 
posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at lbandiera@worldbank.org, bpinto2@
worldbank.org and pkumar1@worldbank.org. 
important development. The paper draws on an analysis 
of debt dynamics, the evolution of domestic interest 
rates, and the latest Investment Climate Assessment to 
present evidence on the criticality of low political risk 
in facilitating good economic outcomes after 2003. The 
December 2007 elections have highlighted other aspects 
of political risk—ethnic and social tensions with roots 
in inequality. The findings of this paper underline the 
importance of establishing a foundation for long-term 
political stability and social cohesion in view of the 
disruptions following the December 2007 elections. This 
process is likely to be at least as difficult and lengthy as 
fundamental economic policy and institutional reform.Kenya’s Quest for Growth Stabilization and Reforms—But Political 
Stability?
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1 This title is a take-off on “Mexico: Stabilization, Reform and No Growth” (Dornbusch and Werner 1994).  
With growth picking up in 2003, Kenya appeared to be one step ahead.  But it will need to make a fresh 
start to overcome the disruption and distrust engendered by the December 2007 Presidential elections. 
2 The authors are all at the World Bank.  This paper is based on background analysis for a Country 
Economic Memorandum being prepared on Kenya.  We thank Viktoria Hnatkovska, Mohan Krishnaswami, 
Claudio Raddatz and Terry Ryan for helpful discussion and comments.  The findings, interpretations and 
conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors.  They do not necessarily represent the 
views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated 
organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent. 1. Introduction 
For decades, Kenya has suffered from low and volatile economic growth—per capita real 
GDP growth averaged 1.2 percent over the period 1960-2000, overwhelmed by a standard 
deviation of 4.8 percent.
3  More recently, notwithstanding deeply-entrenched skepticism, Kenya 
has done well on growth and macroeconomic stabilization.  Over the four years 2003-2006, 
growth averaged 4.9 percent in contrast to virtual stagnation between 1991 and 2002.
4  Inflation 
remained relatively contained at an average 9 percent, but more convincingly, the ratio of 
government debt-to-GDP fell by 5.8 percentage points per year over this period as interest rates 
fell and growth picked up.  These impressive developments fueled optimism that Kenya might at 
last be turning the corner and embarking on a path of sustained growth and poverty reduction.  
However, the violent and disruptive aftermath of the Presidential elections of December 2007 
have placed such optimism on hold. 
  1.1  Objectives and Background 
Kenya’s reputation has been overshadowed to such an extent by its image of being 
corrupt and weakly governed that it might come as a surprise that serious reform began as early 
as 1993.  We highlight the crucial role played by declining political risk after 2002 in at last 
bringing the reforms implemented by Kenya over the previous decade to fruition.  Our analysis 
was completed before the December 2007 elections.  It began in mid-2006, at which point our 
priors were formed on the basis of available reports.  Typical were the following quotes from the 
May 2006 Economist Intelligence Unit report:
5 
The president….will struggle to see out the remainder of his term because of the damage to his 
authority and credibility caused by the “no” vote in the constitutional referendum and corruption 
scandals that have led to the resignation of three senior ministers. 
The Government of National Unity continues to confront serious divisions…. 
                                                      
3 Hnatkovska and Loayza (2005), Appendix A pp. 95-96. 
4The 2007 growth estimate is 6.8 percent, a little short of 5 percent per capita. For 8 out of 12 years from 
1991 to 2002, per capita income growth was almost zero or negative.   
5 All three quotes from “Kenya at a glance: 2006-07” of Country Report Kenya May 2006, EIU. 
  2Only a few months later, in October 2006, a substantially better assessment appeared in a 
Standard & Poor’s report:
6 
Major Rating Factors 
Strengths: 
￿ Macroeconomic and political stability becoming entrenched 
￿ Improving economic growth prospects 
Weaknesses: 
￿ Low level of economic development with severely limited infrastructure and vulnerability to 
exogenous shocks 
￿ High debt compared with similarly rated peers 
￿ Governance issues 
 
The EIU quotes convey the image of corruption and political instability, a combination 
normally associated with stagnation, bad public finances and a poor investment climate.  The 
S&P quotes contain good news on stability and growth but caution that infrastructure is deficient 
and governance a weakness.  We will not try to explain this disconnection in perceptions 
separated by only a few months but will instead present evidence on a perceptible change for the 
better in Kenya’s macroeconomic outcomes starting in 2003/04.  The first step in this study was 
to attempt an explanation for the puzzling observation that real interest rates on Kenyan treasury 
bills were surprisingly low, of the order of 1-3 percent.  How could a corrupt and politically 
unstable country (recall the EIU quotes) have such low interest rates?  The possibility of 
manipulation was rejected because Kenya has a fully convertible currency and an open capital 
account.  If interest rates were being kept artificially low, there would be downward pressure on 
both the exchange rate and foreign exchange reserves; but the opposite was true.  When we asked 
officials or the private sector why interest rates were so low, the standard reply was “Because 
government’s borrowing requirements have come down.”   
However, a review of the government’s debt dynamics strongly suggests that borrowing 
requirements came down because interest rates fell substantially, not the other way round.  
                                                      
6 S&P Credit Research Report Kenya (Republic of) Oct. 23, 2006. A later report in February 2007, by 
JPMorgan titled ‘Kenya: A return to Macroeconomic Stability’ also notes that ‘the turning point for Kenya 
was the 2002 election of President Mwai Kibaki who was elected on an economic reform and anti-
corruption platform.’ 
  3Indeed, with the primary fiscal balance having shrunk and concerns about the composition of 
public spending, the only factor which could explain the big fall in interest rates was a decline in 
country or political risk.
7  Informal interviews with businessmen supported this idea.  The 
encouraging refrain was: “We no longer need political connections to do business in Kenya.”  In 
addition, it was noted that investments and business would continue regardless of the outcome of 
the then-upcoming Presidential elections.  In order to obtain systematic evidence on perceptions 
of politics and business, questions were added to the Investment Climate Assessment (ICA) 
conducted in June 2007.  We report these results in section 5.   
1.2  Main Findings and Organization of the Paper 
Serious data deficiencies—in particular, the availability of a consistent GDP series only 
after 1995/96—are an impediment to an analysis requiring long time series.  Our strategy 
therefore is to persuade the reader by “connecting the dots” among the extent of past reform; a 
review of the evolution of government indebtedness (measured by the debt-to-GDP ratio) and its 
underlying determinants; a decomposition of interest rates to gauge devaluation and default risk; 
and the survey results from the ICA.  We conclude that the positive trends after 2003 were being 
driven by three factors: 
•  lagged benefits of price, trade, exchange rate and interest rate liberalization forced by reduced 
aid after the Goldenberg scandal uncovered in 1992; 
•  solid foundation for solvency based on significant revenue collection as a payoff to the 
reform of tax policy and administration which started in the mid-1990s; and critically, 
•  declining political risk after the successful 2002 elections fueling an improvement in 
sovereign creditworthiness and the private investment climate.   
 
                                                      
7 To paraphrase Sherlock Holmes: When you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however 
improbable, must be the truth. 
  4Two messages are embedded in the above: first, the back-to-the-wall effect of a drastic 
reduction in aid starting in 1992 stimulated substantial reform.  Second, it took the successful 
December 2002 elections and smooth transfer of power from President Arap Moi to President 
Kibaki for visible results to materialize.  This suggests two interacting effects: long lags before 
payoffs to reform appear; and threshold events (such as a successful election) which trigger these 
payoffs.  Not surprisingly, we concluded (prior to the December 2007 elections) that the 
maintenance and acceleration of these positive trends depended crucially on continued success in 
entrenching political stability, improving governance and strengthening fiscal and financial 
institutions; and relaxing the infrastructure constraint on private investment.  The unfortunate 
December 2007 election fiasco has reinforced the key insight of this paper: that sustained growth 
and poverty alleviation will eventually depend upon Kenya’s ability to engender political stability 
and social harmony for a prolonged period; experience from countries as disparate as China, India 
and Vietnam suggests that such stability is needed for a minimum 10-15 years for positive trends 
to take hold.
8  The reasoning is that irrespective of the political system, good governance and 
stability in the rules of the game for a long period are needed for having well-managed public 
finances, investor confidence and hence long-run growth.   
  Section 2 sketches out an analytical framework which underpins the subsequent 
presentation of empirical evidence.  Section 3 contains a snapshot of Kenya’s economic 
liberalization dating to 1993.  Section 4 analyses government debt dynamics, discussing key 
facets such as revenue mobilization and expenditure composition.  While impressive strides have 
been made towards an efficient revenue system based on broad-based taxes, the composition of 
expenditure remains a serious constraint on growth.  Specifically, spending on infrastructure is 
inadequate. Section 5 presents evidence on declining country and political risk based on a 
                                                      
8 Rodrik (1999) contains a seminal analysis of the importance of social cohesion in responding efficiently 
to exogenous shocks and nurturing long-run growth. 
  5decomposition of interest rates and perceptions from Investment Climate Assessments.  Section 6 
discusses challenges—economic and political—looking ahead.      
2. Analytical  Framework 
A reduction in political risk could have a growth dividend through two channels: at the 
macro level, a reduction in real interest rates which improves government debt dynamics and 
contributes to stabilization; and at the micro level, a lengthening of business horizons with its 
corollaries of lower hurdle rates of return for investment projects and greater private investment.  
We start with the micro channel using a slight adaptation of the model in Razin and Sadka (2004).  
The representative competitive firm invests in line with the following Bellman equation: 
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where F(.) is the production function, V(.) a value function,  0 ) 1 ( K δ −  the initial net capital stock 
(δ  is the rate of depreciation, K0 the inherited capital stock), K the chosen capital stock for the 
current period, t the current tax rate, r the world interest rate, θ  a political (country) risk 
premium external to the firm and τ  the future tax rate.  The parameter α  captures the 
investment horizon or equivalently the importance given to the future.  We assume  1 0 ≤ ≤α  
with a higher value connoting a longer horizon.  The first order condition is:
9 
(1)  ) 1 )( 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ατ α δ θ δ + − − + + + = ′ − r K F t . 
We now mimic a short-horizon situation by setting 0 = α .  Equation (1) gets modified as follows: 
(2)  θ + + = ′ − 1 ) ( ) 1 ( r K F t . 
Note that the RHS of (2) is the maximum value of the RHS of (1) for a given world interest rate 
and country risk premium.  In other words, when the horizon is short the hurdle rate for private 
investment is set at its maximum so that the investment can be recouped in short order.  This is 
likely to coincide with a high country risk premium,θ .  Now consider the polar opposite case of 
                                                      
0 = =
9 For a derivation, see Razin and Sadka (2004)—equation (1) is the same as their equation (2) with 
τ θ .  But note that the interpretation of α  is different. 
  6low political risk and a long horizon, which we mimic by setting θ =0 and  1 = α .  Equation (1) 
becomes: 
(3)  τ τ δ + − + = ′ − ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( r K F t . 
Comparing the RHS of equation (3) with that of (2), we see a substantial decline in the hurdle rate 
of return for investment.
10  Figure 1 summarizes these possibilities. 




r + 1 + θ 
r + δ(1-τ) + τ 
Long Horizon 
Long horizon + Tax cuts
B 
K K1  K2 K3
 
The figure shows three levels of the optimal capital stock decisions, K1<K2<K3, 
corresponding to a short horizon (with high political risk), a long horizon (with reduced political 
risk) and a long horizon reinforced by cuts in the marginal tax rate.  In the case of a short horizon 
and high political risk, there is the danger that  θ δ + ≤ − ′ − + 1
1 ( −
] 0 ) 1 [( ) 1 ( r K F t , i.e., that 
investment does not take place.  This would correspond to a situation where  1 0 ) K K > δ  and 
stagnation would result.  On the other hand, investment would resume if political risk falls and 
                                                      
1 ) 1 ( << + −τ τ δ  for reasonable values of δ and 
10 Note that  τ .  For example for a 10 percent 
depreciation rate and a marginal tax rate of 30 percent,  1 37 . 0 ) 1 ( −τ +τ = << δ .  In addition, we have 
the country risk premium on the RHS of (2). 
  7horizons lengthen.  Applied to Kenya, this suggests that the initial binding constraint to overcome 
would be political risk; once this is achieved and the investment climate improves, attention 
might have to turn to other constraints such as infrastructure.  
Turning to the macro, few economists would quarrel with the proposition that 
macroeconomic stability is necessary for sustained economic growth and a good investment 
climate.  However, the focus has shifted (especially after the most recent emerging market public 
debt crises which began in 1997-98 and ended with the Argentine default of 2001) from short-run 
fiscal deficits and inflation to balance in the government’s intertemporal budget constraint.
11  
Satisfying this constraint rests on the capacity to eventually generate adequate primary fiscal 
surpluses, which in turn depends upon future growth and tax collection.
12  Two key points 
emerging from recent empirical work are that balancing the government’s intertemporal budget 
calls for (i) a comprehensive approach to managing the public finances.  Paying attention to 
primary deficits, real interest rates and growth rates is not enough—equally important are bailouts 
and contingent liabilities, the efficiency and predictability of taxation, expenditure composition 
and the rate of return on public investments; and (ii) sound macro-micro linkages.
13  We briefly 
sketch the latter and make the connection with political risk. 
Define government net worth as the present value of future primary surpluses (expressed 
as a ratio of GDP) minus the initial government debt-to-GDP ratio.
14 Since the discount rate is the 
real interest rate minus the real growth rate (assumed to be positive for convergence), a reduction 
in interest rates as a result of reduced political risk will unambiguously increase net worth and 
strengthen government solvency.  What about an accompanying reduction in tax rates?  This will 
have two opposing effects: it will tend to lower revenues and hence the present value of primary 
                                                      
11 The framework which dominated IFI policy thinking on macroeconomics and growth until 1997 might 
well have been Fischer (1993).  
12 Solvency requires that the present value of future primary surpluses (discounted at a rate equal to the real 
interest rate minus the real growth rate) equal or exceed the initial debt-to-GDP ratio. 
13 See IMF (2003), Budina and Fiess (2005), Gill and Pinto (2005). 
14 See Serven (2007). 
  8surpluses; but it will tend to raise private investment and hence growth especially in conjunction 
with a fall in political risk (increasing the capital stock to K3 in Figure 1).  The combination of 
rising growth and lower interest rates will in turn exert an upward effect on net worth which 
could in principle offset the effect of a fall in revenues.  Besides, the fall in revenue could be 
curtailed by improving tax administration which increases the tax base and thus partially or 
completely offsets the impact of lower marginal tax rates.
15 
Now consider government capital expenditure.  If it is cut, the immediate effect will be to 
raise primary surpluses and improve debt dynamics; but net worth could decrease as a result of a 
fall in long-run growth (via complementary reductions in private investment).  This in turn could 
trigger a rise in interest rates if initial indebtedness is high and tax revenues fall with growth.  Of 
course, if capital expenditure is of low quality, a cut would be unambiguously beneficial.  In 
Kenya’s case as we shall see, the reduction in interest rates and cut in marginal tax rates have 
contributed to an accelerated decline in indebtedness (government debt-to-GDP ratio) after 2003; 
but growth diagnostics indicate that more public spending is needed to alleviate the infrastructure 
constraint on private investment.  The challenge therefore is to choose infrastructure projects with 
high rates of return which will ensure that the government’s net worth is protected.
16  However, 
in line with the main point of this paper, this is secondary to managing political risk. 
                                                     
3.  Kenya’s Economic Liberalization: A Snapshot 
17 
The economic liberalization started with Sessional Paper Number 1 of January 1986, 
when the government decided to shift from dirigisme to freeing up the economy.  By the late 
1980s, Kenya had adopted a managed float.  Then a series of incidents intervened after the Berlin 
Wall collapsed in November 1989 and Kenya began to lose its geopolitical bargaining power (as 
 
15 Many developing countries offer the prospect of raising average effective tax rates (and hence total 
revenues) even when marginal tax rates are cut by enlarging the tax base through better administration. 
16 A detailed analytical discussion is contained in Serven (2007). 
17 Sources: Meetings with academicians, private sector firms, IMF files. 
  9it was the most prominent market economy in the region and the US fleet was able to use 
Mombasa port).  Here is a brief timeline: 
•  Nov 1991: Emphasis in Consultative Group shifts abruptly from economics to governance.  
Donors freeze aid. 
•  Jan 1992: IMF refuses to go to its Board with an unfinanced gap. The World Bank pulls back 
loans in response. 
•  1992: Kenya starts building up external debt arrears; foreign exchange becomes the critical 
constraint. 
•  End 1994: IMF shadow program enables Paris Club rescheduling. 
Prior to the 1994 IMF program, turbulence hit in the shape of the notorious Goldenberg 
scandal (1991-93), interest rates on treasury bills went to 80 percent and banks allied to 
Goldenberg’s Exchange Bank collapsed.  This scandal arose out of a fraudulent effort to exploit 
schemes set up by the central bank to encourage exports and help alleviate the shortage of foreign 
exchange that occurred as external debt payments fell due and new loans and aid were cut back.
18  
Liberalization continued and by the end of 1994, prices, interest rates and the exchange rate were 
liberalized.  In the meanwhile, aid became small and unpredictable and since 1994/95, net foreign 
financing to the government of Kenya has been negative except for 2001/02 and 2005/06, when 
there was a debt rescheduling.  As a result, domestic borrowing served not only to finance the 
deficit but also pay off maturing external debt. 
Two points are worth noting.  First, the hardening of the donors’ stance on governance 
grounds and the need to re-establish credibility in the wake of Goldenberg were major spurs to 
                                                      
18 Goldenberg International was set up in 1990 to export gold and diamond jewelry from Kenya in return 
for a 35 percent premium on the exchange rate in contrast to the normal premium of 20 percent for 
exporters.  Little or no gold was actually exported; a scheme was established to round-trip the sale of export 
dollars to the Central Bank of Kenya (essentially, buy dollars at the official exchange rate, sell them back at 
a 35 percent premium as “gold exports” and then repeat the process). It was finally uncovered in 1992.  
Warutere (2005).   
  10reform in Kenya.  Second, private sector firms interviewed in mid-2006 invariably pointed to the 
liberalization which picked up steam in 1993/94 as a positive turning point. 
4.  Government Debt Dynamics  
A key requirement for macro stabilization noted in section 2 is balance in the 
government’s intertemporal budget constraint, for which a sufficient condition is that public debt 
be on a sustainable trajectory, i.e., there is no need for a drastic change in fiscal policies to rein in 
indebtedness.  If intertemporal balance is not assured, there will be a tendency for 
macroeconomic uncertainty to increase, engendering expectations of rising inflation and interest 
rates, which will slow down private investment and growth.  Governments borrow when they run 
fiscal deficits, which can be decomposed into the primary fiscal deficit and interest payments.  
The path of the debt-to-GDP ratio is then determined by the primary deficit and a term 
proportional to the difference between the real interest rate and the real growth rate.  If the 
primary deficit is positive and large, and real interest rates exceed growth rates, then the debt-to-
GDP ratio will grow until corrective action is taken or a crisis—typically involving a burst of 
inflation and/or a disruptive debt default—forces such action.  Debt can also increase when the 
government issues recapitalization bonds to bail out banks or takes over the guaranteed loans of 
loss-making parastatals, while the opposite happens when government assets are privatized.   
Box 1 summarizes difficulties encountered in assembling the debt data as well as data on 
macro variables more generally, while Figure 2 shows the path of Kenya’s debt-to-GDP ratio and 
its currency composition over the past 11 years. The government debt-to-GDP ratio has fallen by 
some 27 percentage points over the past 11 years to a level of 46 percent by the end of 2006/07, 
while the share of foreign-currency denominated debt has gone down from about 80 percent of 
total debt in 1996/97 to 50 percent at the end of 2006/07.  This shift towards domestic debt was 
occasioned by the need to pay off maturing external debt and compensate for the reduction in 
external aid after 1993; but at the same time, there has been an impressive reduction in 
indebtedness as shown in Figure 2. 
  11Box 1: Debt and Macro Data  
 
In Figure 2, domestic debt is net of government deposits in the banking system and on-lending.  External 
debt is on a gross basis and includes borrowings from the IMF. 
In compiling statistics on external debt, data from 3 different sources were compared: World Economic 
Outlook and staff reports (IMF); Global Development Finance (World Bank); and the statistical bulletins of 
the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the Central Bank (CBK). All institutions report data on gross external 




(In millions of US dollars)
1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07
IMF 5,666 5,755 5,454 5,286 4,713 4,907 5,088 5,119 5,068 5,000 5,370
World Bank 1/ 6,814 6,465 6,824 6,475 6,145 5,521 6,128 6,869 6,919 6,428 6,534
Kenya 5,915 5,366 5,476 5,426 4,988 4,795 5,488 5,573 5,695 5,837 5,955
Difference max-min 572 389 22 253 275 538 861 1197 627 837 585
Source: IMF WEO and Staff Reports; GDF; and Statistical bulletins of the Ministry of Finance of Kenya
1/ Calendar year. It includes use of IMF credit  
 
Eventually, the choice fell on the data published by the MoF as better documented, consistent with monthly 
data published by CBK and consistent with past external borrowing requirements from the fiscal accounts. 
 
Also, the collection of macro aggregates proved difficult. In 2005, the Central Bureau of Statistics updated 
the methodology for estimating GDP so as to better capture the contribution of services in the economy.  
The published series now goes back only to 1996, preventing a longer time series on the debt-to-GDP ratio.  
In addition, data on key macroeconomic variables such as the fiscal accounts, balance of payments, interest 
rates, prices and exchange rates are difficult to find from the same source on a consistent basis (i.e. IMF 
staff reports or GDF), for years before 1996.  
 
Figure 2 Kenya: Public Debt 














  12  4.1 What Has Lowered the Debt Ratio? 
  In Table 1, the annual average change in indebtedness is algebraically apportioned to the 
primary fiscal balance (including grants, which averaged approximately 1 percent of GDP per 
year over both the sub-periods in the table), growth, real interest and exchange rates and other 
factors like bank bailouts, debt relief, etc.  The starting point is the debt-to-GDP ratio at the end 
of the fiscal year 1995/96.  The subsequent 11 years are divided into two sub-periods: 1996/97-
2002/03 and 2003/04-2006/07.  For each sub-period, the average annual change in the debt-to-
GDP ratio is given, as well as the portion attributable to the factors mentioned above.  
Table 1. Factors Explaining Falling Indebtedness 1996/97-2006/07 
(% points of GDP, annual average) 
1996/97 2003/04  1996/97 
  -2002/3 -2006/07  -2006/07 
Change in public sector debt  -1.8 -5.8  -3.2 
Contribution from      
1. Primary Deficit (- surplus)  -1.7 -0.1  -1.1 
2. Real GDP growth  -1.4 -2.8  -1.9 
3. Real interest rate  2.1 0.3  1.5 
4. Real exchange rate (- appreciation)  0.6 -2.5  -0.5 
5. Other Factors  -1.4 -0.7  -1.1 
 
The first compelling observation is that the rate at which indebtedness has been falling 
jumped from 1.8 percentage points of GDP per year over the first 7 years to 5.8 percentage points 
per year over the last four years.  The biggest factor explaining this sharp acceleration is the joint 
effect of the large decline in real interest rates and the real appreciation of the Kenyan shilling 
after 2003.
19   During the first 7 years, as a result of the combined effect of the real interest rate 
and real exchange rate (lines 3. and 4. in the table), debt rose by 2.7 percentage points of GDP per 
year, while the combined effect has been to lower debt by 2.2 percentage points of GDP per year 
after 2003, a swing of close to 5 percentage points of GDP.  The acceleration in growth rates has 
also helped significantly in the reduction of debt ratio.  Second, the accelerated decline in 
                                                      
19 Strictly speaking, one has to look at the effective real interest rate, which would capture the effects of 
both inflation and exchange rates and related capital gains/losses, by summing up rows 3. and 4. in Table 1. 
  13indebtedness occurred even though the average primary fiscal surplus (including grants) fell by 
1.6 percentage points of GDP; we will return to this point later when political risk is discussed.  
Third, big collapses of the real exchange rate (RER) and bank/other bailouts, which were salient 
features of most of the emerging market debt crises of the past decade, have not been major 
factors in Kenya.
20   
4.2 Primary Fiscal Balance and Interest Payments 
  Figure 3 plots the primary balance and interest payments over the period 1995/96-
2006/07.  Two observations stand out: (i) the primary fiscal surplus including grants went up in 
the wake of the Goldenberg scandal and reached close to 6 percent of GDP by the mid-1990s but 
has been on a declining trend ever since, i.e., the primary deficit has been rising; and (ii) interest 
payments have fallen from 6 percent of GDP in 1995/96 to 2.8 percent in 2006/07.
21 
Figure 3 Primary Balance and Interest Payment  





























































































Primary balance Interest payment
 
  The fall in interest payments (and interest rates, as we shall see later) even as the primary 
deficit was rising (primary surplus shrinking) is puzzling.  A plausible explanation is that the 
                                                      
20 See the country case studies in Budina and Fiess (2005).  It also contains a derivation of the flow budget 
constraint of the government forming the basis for the decomposition shown in Table 1. 
21 Unfortunately, we do not have a consistent GDP series for pre-1995.  Earlier numbers showed 
government interest payments to be as high as 10-12 percent of GDP in the aftermath of Goldenberg. 
  141991-93 Goldenberg scandal engendered a great deal of macroeconomic volatility and left little 
option but to raise the primary surplus sharply; and both the primary surplus and interest 
payments then gradually returned to ‘normal’ levels.  The Goldenberg scandal is estimated to 
have cost $600 million to $1 billion, some 9 to 16 percent of 1994 GDP (Warutere 2005). Efforts 
to mop-up excessive monetary infusion arising from the scandal pushed interest rates on T-bills to 
over 80 percent (Figure 8 below).  Kenya was also forced to shift to domestic debt to pay off 
maturing external debt as a result of the accompanying aid squeeze.  A large increase in the 
primary fiscal surplus was engineered in an attempt to bolster credibility and a significant 
liberalization was set in train.  Import licenses were abolished in May 1993, a unified, market-
based exchange rate adopted in November 1993 and exchange controls lifted in May 1994.  The 
era of price controls ended in 1994.  As a result of this freeing up, foreign exchange flowed in, 
helping drive interest rates down.
22  Thus, positive macroeconomic benefits started appearing 
before 2002 but growth stagnated. 
  A second possible explanation for falling interest rates in spite of the fall in the primary 
surplus is that the latter was driven by adjustments in fiscal policy designed to support private 
investment and long-run growth.  This could happen for example if marginal tax rates were cut 
and/or public spending to alleviate infrastructure bottlenecks were raised.  In the short run, this 
would reduce the primary surplus but with the promise of better prospects for long-run growth 
and tax collection, as discussed in section 2.  Countering this is the argument that markets tend to 
be myopic and that the quality of Kenya’s past public investments has been low—which would 
strengthen the argument that interest rates fell because of reduced political risk rather than market 
perceptions of higher government net worth.  Revenue mobilization is now discussed, followed 
by expenditure composition. 
 
 
                                                      
22 Source: Interview with Kenyan academics. 
  154.3  Revenue Mobilization  
  We shall show that Kenya has managed a successful transition from a high tax rate, low 
tax base system with considerable reliance on import taxes and seigniorage to a more efficient 
and equitable revenue system based on broad-based taxes like income tax and VAT.  This 
accomplishment is considered difficult to achieve—countries marked by political instability, 
social division and weak governance, which is the stereotypical image of Kenya, are more likely 
to rely on seigniorage and import tariffs, taxes which are relatively easy to collect but highly 
distortionary, and probably regressive in the case of seigniorage.
23 
The rise in the primary surplus in the wake of Goldenberg was achieved in part by raising 
tax rates.  This plus high inflation boosted the tax take and pushed the revenue-to-GDP ratio to 
about 25 percent in the early-to-mid 1990s.
24  It was felt that maintaining such a high rate of 
revenue mobilization would deter growth, so tax rates were cut and the revenue-to-GDP target 
lowered to 21-22 percent of GDP.  Considerable reform in tax policy and administration has been 
implemented since the mid-1990s.  After 2003, governance improvements have boosted direct tax 
collections notwithstanding large reductions in the CIT rate and the top PIT rate to 30 percent 
(from peak levels 45 percent each earlier in the decade).  VAT rates and import tariffs have also 
been cut significantly.  A ‘large taxpayers office’ was set up in 2006 whereby 800 companies pay 
some 70 percent of total direct taxes. 
  Figure 4 plots four important revenue components: import and excise duties, income tax 
and VAT as a percentage of GDP.  Revenues fell as tax rates were cut but then picked up after 
2003 as a result of stronger tax administration.  The steady decline in import duty collection is by 
design, given the trade liberalization policy.  Income tax displays a u-shaped pattern, falling in the 
late 1990s, but then, unlike import duty, recovering over the last three years.  This is encouraging 
to the extent that it captures lower tax rates combined with a broadening of the tax base and 
                                                      
23 Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992).   
24 Source: Meeting with Kenya Revenue Authority officials, February 2007. 
  16improving compliance—which is the case in Kenya.  VAT was introduced in 1990; the number of 
rates has been reduced from 15 (with the highest rate once 210 percent) to a unified rate 16 
percent (except some zero-rated products), with obvious advantages for reducing 
misclassification and tax evasion and easing administration. Excise duties have been largely 
replaced by the VAT, but remain on oil imports and other specific products.  
Figure 4 Revenue Mobilization 




























































































Revenue, excluding grants    Income Tax    VAT
   Import Duty    Excise Duty
 
 
  What about seigniorage?  Figure 5 plots both the growth rate of reserve (base) money and 








  17 


































Growth in Reserve Money (%) Change in Reserve Money (% of GDP, right scale)
 
Both the level and volatility of these indicators have declined sharply after 1999.  This in turn 
could have contributed to lower macroeconomic uncertainty and inflation, lowering interest rates. 
Likewise, Figure 6 shows that the effective import tariff rate and the share of import duties in 
total revenues, which were at peak levels after Goldenberg, have both come down sharply.  The 
immediate impact of cutting import tariffs would be to increase the primary deficit (as we have 
seen) and lower the cost of imported machinery and raw materials as well as the tax on exports by 
Lerner symmetry.  In combination with cuts in income tax rates, which raise the private returns to 
capital, the cut in import tariffs would increase competition from imports, spurring both more 
investment and higher productivity in firms, improving growth prospects.   




























































































































   Effective Tariff Rate (%)    Import Duty (% of Revenue) 
Private sector firms interviewed in mid-2006 unanimously concurred that the economic 
liberalization starting in 1993 has been a major stimulus to higher efficiency and productivity 
(Box 2). Microeconomic evidence from Investment Climate Assessment 2007 corroborates this 
anecdotal evidence. It confirms significant growth in total factor productivity during the period 
2002-2006 after stagnation during the 1990s.
25 
Box 2: Vignettes from Interviews with Private Sector Firms, July 2006 
 
•  Firms noted that reductions in import tariffs had spurred exports because it had lowered their costs, 
exactly as Lerner symmetry would predict.   One firm described this as decisive in doubling its 
capacity in 2003, even more important than the fall in interest rates. 
•  All firms mentioned pressures to increase efficiency and productivity by reducing waste and 
technological upgrading because of greater competition and falling profit margins as a consequence of 
lower import barriers. Many mentioned adopting Gemba Kaizen techniques to reduce waste, get 
workers more involved in preventive maintenance and doing things better on the shop floor.
a/  One 
multinational said it had reduced manufacturing unit costs by 30-40 percent in spite of rising labor and 
energy costs. 
•  Kenyan labor was typically described as well-educated and the best in the region. 
•  While the increased competition has not so far led to bankruptcies, the expectation was voiced that 
loss-making parastatals will eventually close. 
 
In short: competition and hard budget constraints are forcing firms to become more efficient and 
innovative, while the increased incentive for exports is spurring capacity expansion. 
 
a/ Gemba Kaizen in Japanese means change for the better (kaizen) in the workplace (gemba).  It was 
originated by Masaaki Imai, a Japanese management consultant, who established the Kaizen Institute in 
1986. 
  
A point worth making is that in spite of the cut in VAT, income tax and import tariff 
rates, which contributed to the decline in revenues since the mid-1990s till 2001/02, the revenue-
to-GDP ratio at around 21 percent is still high in Kenya compared to other countries of a similar 
income level.  Kenya collects at least 4-7 percentage points of GDP more in revenue than its EAC 
partners, Tanzania and Uganda, and is a positive outlier among developing countries.   
 
 
                                                      
25 Based on a firm-level production function, Soderbom (2004) reported that average firm TFP increased by 
7percent (but was not statistically significantly different from zero) over the entire 1999-2002 period. Using 
a similar methodology, ICA (World Bank 2007) provides preliminary evidence that TFP increased in 
manufacturing firms by a statistically significant 15 percent over 2002-2006. 
  19  4.4  Expenditure Composition 
  The major complaint voiced by the private sector pertains to the quantity and quality of 
infrastructure.  Roads in particular are singled out—the fuel levy has not translated into better 
roads.
26  This brings us to the Achilles’ heel of the Kenyan public finances: expenditure policy.  
Figure 7 plots total primary expenditure and two of its key components: development expenditure 
and recurrent expenditure in the past ten years. Development expenditure consists largely of 
capital expenditure, and most of it is on public infrastructure. During the fiscal consolidation of 
the 1990s, development expenditure was cut from a high of 6.4 percent of GDP in 1994/95 to 1.9 
percent in 1999/2000. These cuts were accompanied by deterioration in the quality of public 
investment portfolio. A number of construction projects with questionable economic rationale 
were taken up (Eldoret airport was a prime example) and a large stock of incomplete projects 
accumulated.
27  
Figure 7 Primary Expenditure  
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26 The Road Maintenance Fuel Levy was established in 1993. It consists of an automotive fuel levy and 
transit toll collections. The objective of the levy was to provide funds for maintenance of roads; its 
proceeds are also used for rehabilitation and reconstruction. In 2006/07, approximately KSh 18.6 billion 
(1% of GDP) was collected as fuel levy.  
 
27 Kenya, Public Expenditure Review 1997.  World Bank (1997). 
  20The neglect of infrastructure in the 1990s resulted in a huge backlog of road maintenance 
and the network is now not maintainable at the current levels of spending. It is estimated that 
clearing the backlog of maintenance alone would cost KSh 150 billion (about 9 percent of 2006 
GDP); periodic and routine maintenance require an additional 15 billion KSh per year. If 
urgently-needed network expansion and capacity enhancement are included, it is estimated that 
the annual spending requirement over a 7-year period is about 4 percent of GDP against the 
2006/07 allocation of about 2.7 percent of GDP.
28    
The challenge therefore is to scale-up spending in order to maintain and rehabilitate 
infrastructure while ensuring the quality of investment portfolio. This challenge needs to be seen 
in conjunction with the competing demand for social spending, which has been increasing at a 
fast pace following the adoption of free primary education in 2003 and various health goals by the 
government.  
5.  Political Stability and the Country Risk Premium 
  Interviews with private sector and participants in financial markets show that 2003 was 
considered a watershed year.  The change in political leadership was seen as the culmination of a 
successful transition to multi-party democracy, a process that began in 1992.  It was widely 
believed that Kenya’s political development was irreversible and economic policies unlikely to 
change dramatically with changes in political leadership.
29 In other words, there was a decline in 
perceived political and economic risk by investors.   
 
 
                                                      
28 Sessional Paper: The Development and Management of the Roads Sector for Sustainable Economic 
Growth:, Ministry of Roads and Public Works, Nairobi, 2006. 
29 A statement by Titus Naikuni, chief executive of Kenya Airways, reported in Financial Times, June 13, 
2007, characterizes the changed political scene and attitude of businesses. He said, “I think we’ve sort of 
separated the politicians, who are making noise, from those of us who want to make money. Because the 
politicians realize that without this money we won’t have development.” Of the election, he says, “It’s time 
people realized Kenya has become very mature, in the sense that the business community couldn’t care less 
about what happens. I don’t put our business plans based on whether we’re going to elect Kibaki or 
someone else.” 
  215.1  Inferences from Domestic Interest Rates 
What can be inferred about country risk from the Kenyan government’s domestic 
borrowing costs?  Figure 8 shows the annualized yield on the 91-day T-bill rate.  There is a clear 
declining trend after the spike associated with the Goldenberg scandal, with interest rates 
continuing to fall and going below 10 percent starting in 2002, with lows in 2003 and 2004.  
Since Kenya has no exchange controls, the following formal construct can help shed light on 
risks: 
   ,   SRP DRP x i iK + + + = ˆ $
where   is the nominal interest rate on Kenyan government T-bills (denominated in Kenyan 
shillings),   is that on US government T-bills (denominated in USD) and   is the target 
devaluation rate for the KSh/USD exchange rate.  This is standard interest parity.  Risk could 
arise on two counts: suppose the market believes the eventual depreciation rate will turn out 
higher than that (explicitly or implicitly) targeted by the central bank, CBK.  It will then demand 
a devaluation risk premium, DRP, to compensate for this.  Suppose it also believes, given 
Kenya’s image of political instability and weak governance that the government could default on 
its debt.  It would then demand a sovereign or default risk premium, SRP, to compensate for this.  
The SRP could be regarded as a function of Kenya’s credit and inflation history, its political risk 
and the quality of its fiscal and financial institutions. 
K i
$ i x ˆ
  22Figure 8 Kenya 91-Day T-bill rate  

















































































































































Table 2 presents data organized around the preceding equation.  It shows that Kenyan t-
bill rates have fallen along with US t-bill rates, suggesting that the favorable global interest rate 
climate has filtered through to Kenya; this is particularly evident in 2003 and 2004.  In addition, 
changes in monetary policy may have contributed to the very low interest rates in 2003 and 2004: 
the cash reserve ratio was lowered from 10 percent to 8 percent and then  6 percent.  This 
coincided with the maturing of a large tranche of repo operations, boosting short-run liquidity and 
lowering domestic interest rates.
30  Of course, since Kenya has an open capital account, this 
money could leave and be invested in US or UK T-bills; this would put upward pressure on 
Kenyan T-bill interest rates.  Alternatively, banks and other investors may be hampered from 
investing overseas because of prudential restrictions; however, there is little evidence that such 
restrictions are binding.
31  Besides, investors have the option of investing in capital market or real 
estate if returns on T-bills are considered too low.  One additional factor may be contributing to 
                                                      
30 Source: Meeting with CBK officials.  Interviews with current and former senior officials indicate a 
deliberate strategy to stimulate the economy after 2003 by lowering interest rates and targeting moderate 
inflation rather than inflation in the 0-5 percent.  
31 For example, the Retirement Benefits Authority requires pension funds to invest no more than 15 percent 
of their funds overseas; but the actual volume is 5-10 percent. 
  23low interest rates: Kenya as a regional safe haven for financial assets.
32  Such investors are not 
likely to be fussy about the rate of return. 
Table 2. Interest Rate Decomposition 
(In percent) 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
91-Day Tbill 13.3 12.1 12.7 8.9 3.7 3.0 8.4 6.8 6.8
U.S. Treasury bill 4.7 5.8 3.5 1.6 1.0 1.4 3.2 4.7 4.4
Diference 8.6 6.2 9.3 7.3 2.7 1.6 5.3 2.1 2.4
Actual KSh./US$ depreciation 17.8 7.0 0.7 -1.9 -1.2 1.6 -6.4 -4.1 -9.7
EMBI Africa (in basis points) .. .. .. 529 232 177 145 74 166
Nigeria 1338 2037 1426 2276 732 667 523 481 ..
South Africa .. .. .. 238 141 95 85 85 164
EMBI+ Spread (in basis points) 824 756 731 765 418 356 245 169 239
Source: Central Bank of Kenya; International Financial Statistics; JPMorgan; and Staff estimates.  
In Table 2, the difference between US T-bill and Kenyan T-bill rates has fallen sharply 
starting in 2003, indicating declining devaluation and default risk; the average difference during 
1999-2002 was 7.9 percentage points but went down to 2.8 percentage points during the 2003-
2007 period. Unfortunately, there is not a way of disentangling the DRP and the SRP.  A standard 
way of doing so is to assign the same SRP to Kenyan T-bills as that on an instrument of similar 
maturity issued in the international capital markets (with SRP given by the spread on such an 
instrument relative to an identical currency and maturity borrowing by a benchmark country, such 
as the US) and then obtain the DRP as a residual; but Kenya’s external debt is mainly on 
concessional terms and it has not had access to the international capital markets.  Ex post, the 
Kenyan shilling has been on an appreciating trend since 2002, as can be seen from the table.   
In October 2006, S&P rated Kenya’s capacity to repay long term sovereign obligations 
denominated in foreign currency as B+, which indicates that the sovereign has the capacity to 
meet its financial commitment, but adverse business, financial, or economic conditions could 
impair its capacity.  Countries that received the same S&P rating of B+ in 2006 and are tracked 
by the EMBI+ index exhibited a spread of over 200 basis points (bps) at end-2006 over the U.S. 
                                                      
32 For example, for oil money from southern Sudan.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that the Kenyan shilling 
is widely tendered in the region, including in troubled areas like Somalia. 
  24Treasuries, about 30 bps above the overall EMBI+ spread at end-2006.
33  Table 2 also presents 
the EMBI spread for Africa and the EMBI+ spread, which have been on a declining trend since 
2002, attesting to the improved global interest rate climate, from which Kenya has also benefited.  
What is exceptional when Kenya’s experience is stacked against that of even emerging 
market countries is its ability to issue nominal (i.e., un-indexed) local currency debt at single-digit 
interest rates when countries such as Brazil and Turkey have had great difficulty in doing so in 
spite of running significant primary surpluses (far greater than Kenya’s) for several years in a row 
(Brazil since 1999).  This indicates a high degree of macro policy credibility and the absence of 
“debt intolerance” (Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano 2003).  Further, Kenya’s debt structure is less 
vulnerable to external shocks as a result of the falling share of external debt over the past decade.  
Finally, Kenya’s debt dynamics are favorable and it has been growing impressively over the past 
three years in contrast to the debt sustainability problems and slow growth in many of the 
emerging market countries. 
In January 2008, following post-election violence, S&P downgraded Kenya’s long-term 
local currency rating to B+ from its earlier level of BB- and long-term foreign currency to B from 
B+, five levels below investment grade. 
5.2  Survey Evidence from the Investment Climate Assessment 
What would be the implications of greater confidence and lower country risk?  One 
would expect to see firms more willing to reinvest profits instead of depositing these in an 
overseas bank account.  One would also expect investment horizons to lengthen, so that the 
hurdle rate for investments goes down.
34 Indeed, the rising political and macroeconomic stability 
                                                      
33 The Emerging Markets Bond Index Plus (EMBI+) tracks total returns for traded external debt 
instruments in the emerging markets. In addition to serving as a benchmark, the EMBI+ provides investors 
with a definition of the market for emerging markets external-currency debt, a list of the instruments 
traded, and a compilation of their terms. The EMBI+  tracks instruments mainly from the three major Latin 
American countries (Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico), reflecting the size and liquidity of these external debt 
markets. The non-Latin countries are represented in the index by Bulgaria, Morocco, Nigeria, Philippines, 
Poland, Russia, and South Africa. 
 
34 See section 2.   
  25has led to a significantly reduced perception of risk on these two counts by the surveyed firms. In 
the Investment Climate Assessment (ICA) conducted by the World Bank in June 2007, the 
percentage of manufacturing firms which perceived political instability or uncertainty as a 
“major-to-severe” constraint dropped to 18 percent in June 2007 from 47 percent in 2003. 
Similarly, the percentage of manufacturing firms that consider macroeconomic stability to be a 
major constraint dropped to 28 percent in 2007 from 50 percent in 2003. Table 3 presents the 
changes in perceptions of manufacturing firms about the investment climate between 2003 and 
2007.
35 ICA 2007 also reported that a larger percentage of surveyed manufacturing firms were 
preparing multiyear business plans in 2007 (58 percent) than five years before (49 percent). 
A last remarkable observation is in order from Table 3.  A higher percentage of firms 
considered electricity and transportation to be constraints in 2007 than in 2003.  One possibility is 
that these sectors deteriorated between 2003 and 2007; but that does not appear plausible. The 
operational performance of Kenya Power and Lighting Company – the power operator - 
improved considerably after its management was contracted out to an international company in 
2006. The number of power outages went down by about 40 percent between 2004 and June 
2007, and new connections have increased by more than 50 percent.   
Table 3 Percent of Manufacturing Firms Perceiving Issue as Being a 
Major or Severe Constraint to Business 
Issue 2003  2007 
Crime, Theft and Disorder  69  59 
Tax Rates  69  56 
Electricity 47  55 
Corruption 73  54 
Transportation 36  53 
Practices of Competitors in Informal Sector  64  50 
Tax Administration  52  50 
Customs and Trade Regulations  40  42 
Telecommunications 45  28 
Business licensing and Permits  13  28 
Macroeconomic Instability  50  28 
Access to Finance  71  26 
Political Instability  47  18 
Access to Land  23  16 
                                                      
35 These data are for a panel of 169 manufacturing firms that participated in both surveys. 
  26Labor Regulations  22  16 
Inadequately Educated Labor Force  31  11 
Source: Kenya ICA, 2003 and 2007.     
 
 
Similar hard data for transport are not available but the government has been allocating increasing 
amounts for road rehabilitation since 2005/06. A more likely possibility is that the increased 
dissatisfaction with infrastructure reflects a resurgence in investment. Between 2003 and 2006, 
expenditure on gross fixed capital formation expanded at an average of 16 percent per year 
(Economic Survey 2007, Kenya National Bureau of Statistics).  This evidence is consistent with 
the idea that after 2003, infrastructure services replaced political and macroeconomic risk as the 
binding constraint to private investment.
36 
  A last piece of persuasive evidence supporting a sharp improvement in the investment 
climate is provided by import trends.  Figure 9 shows a marked increase in the imports of 
machinery and industrial transport equipment after 2003.  These imports averaged 5.6 percent of 
gross domestic expenditure (GDE, equal to consumption plus investment plus government 
spending) over 1996-2002.  This went up to 9.3 percent of GDE over 2003-2006. 
Figure 9 Imports of Machinery and Transport Equipment 












































                                                      
36 For the binding constraint approach to growth diagnostics, see Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco (2005). 
  276.  Challenges Looking Ahead: Concluding Remarks 
 The  economic policy challenge for Kenya is to consolidate macroeconomic stabilization 
while continuing to accelerate growth.  There are two ways of describing this challenge:  
1.  Increasing spending on the social sectors and infrastructure without compromising 
government solvency 
2.  Raising the rate of return to private capital while lowering the cost of capital. 
  The good news in challenge 1 is that Kenya does not appear to have a debt sustainability 
problem and therefore has more latitude in generating ‘fiscal space’ for infrastructure and social 
spending, than many MICs with such a problem, which has severely constrained their fiscal space 
options.
37  Its debt dynamics have been especially favorable for the past 4 years as shown above 
and real interest rates have been low.  With indebtedness on a steady decline over the past 10 
years, the key question that policymakers need to ask is whether this trend should be preserved or 
whether an alternative goal may be socially more desirable, such as either keeping the 
government debt-to-GDP ratio constant or even letting it rise in the short-run while the 
infrastructure constraint is alleviated.  The key point is to select infrastructure projects with high 
economic rates of return and ensure that infrastructure services are priced at a cost-recovery level.  
This together with any acceleration in growth as a result of relaxing the infrastructure constraint 
on private investment should ensure that over the long-term, the additional public investments 
pay for themselves.  Resources can also be released for higher infrastructure investment through 
more efficient spending. For example, an ongoing study shows that the quality of roads portfolio 
can be improved by selecting projects with higher economic returns. There is also scope for 
curtailing waste through more efficient procurement. Similarly, in the education sector, better 
allocation of the time of existing teachers will help in financing the ongoing expansion on a 
fiscally sustainable basis while improving the quality of education outcomes.   
                                                      
37 See for example Gill and Pinto (2005). 
  28Challenge 2 is related to challenge 1 in that relaxing the infrastructure constraint will 
raise the return to private capital.  In addition to macroeconomic stabilization, a crucial factor for 
keeping interest rates and the cost of capital low is political stability, which will also lengthen 
private investment horizons and thus the threshold rate of return for investment projects. We 
conclude by discussing this political stability challenge, which has superseded the economic 
policy challenge. 
Notwithstanding significant reform spurred by a reduction in aid by donors on 
governance grounds and as an attempt to bolster credibility after the costly and disruptive 
Goldenberg scandal broke in 1992, tangible results took a decade to emerge in the form of 
sharply improved government debt dynamics, faster growth and lower interest rates.  We argue 
that the peaceful presidential elections and smooth transfer of power in 2003 was a threshold 
event enabling positive economic outcomes.  While the latter coincided with falling global 
interest rates and a pick-up in growth throughout the developing world, we base our evidence on 
the vastly improved debt dynamics of the government and surveys of private investors, who 
pointed to rising political stability as a major factor lengthening their business planning horizons. 
Besides, interest rates fell in spite of a shrinking primary surplus.  Apart from lowered country 
risk, this has been facilitated by a rise in the revenue-to-GDP ratio after 2003 even though 
marginal tax rates were cut, attesting to better governance and tax administration.   
Against this background, the new round of political instability unleashed by the flawed 
December 2007 presidential elections presents a formidable challenge.  Not only is there need to 
achieve a speedy resolution, there is a fundamental need to establish political stability for an 
extended period of time—considerably longer than that achieved over the 5 years 2003-2007.  
This challenge promises to be at least as difficult as that of policy and institutional reform. 
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